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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which Plaintiffs and Appellants 
(hereinafter "appellants") and defendants and re-
spondents (hereinafter "respondents") both sought 
summary judgments quieting title to a strip of land be-
tween properties owned by the respective parties, rec-
ord title to which is in the appellants and title to which 
is claimed by respondents under the theory of "bound-
ary by acquiescence.'' 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'r 
Respondents' motion for summary J·udgment , VaR 
granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to vacate the summary judgment 
granted the respondents in the lower court and have 
summary judgment entered in favor of the appellants, 
or, in the alternative, to have the cause remanded to 
the lower court for trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are the record owners of real property 
located in Bountiful, Utah. They acquired title to their 
property from Daniel Murray Davis, father of appellaut 
Ross J. Davis, in March of 1966. (R-37, Ex. A) 
Respondents are the record owners of a lot directly 
to the south and adjacent to appellant's property. Ap-
pellant Lois B. Riley acquired title to appellants' prop-
erty in June of 1956, by deed from her husband which 
made her a joint tenant \\ith him. Her husband, Leoni-
das G. Riley originally acquired this property in 1920 
(Deposition of Lois Brough Riley, pg. 4, Ex. 1; R-7~ 
with Ex.) Leonidas G. Riley died June 2, 1964. In J mw 
of 1965, respondent Lois B. Riley deeded respondents' 
property to respondents Leon B. Riley and Glen K. 
Riley, who hold it in trust for respondents Lois B. 
Riley. (Deposition of Lois Brough Riley, p~. 8; Ex. 3 
to deposition of Lois Brough Riley) 
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The legal descriptions contained in the various 
deeds to appellants and respondents' properties coin-
cide with the survey of the properties and the plat 
thNeof filed in the office of the Davis County Recorder. 
(R-37 with attached Exs. B and C) 
The properties owned hy hoth the appellants and 
the respondents were originally owned by Daniel K. 
Davis, father of Daniel Murray Davis and grandfather 
of appellant Ross .J. Davis. The land was used by Dan-
iel K. Davis for agricultural purposes. A fence was 
erected by Daniel K. Davis while he owned the prop-
E>rty - and before it was divided - to keep cattle out 
of his garden and orchard. The fence was never in-
frnded as a houndary line. ·when Lois Brough Riley 
fir~t observed it in 1934, all that remained were the same 
fonr poles that are still standing. (Deposition of Lois 
Brough Riley, pg. 2, 27). The post in a most easterly 
position is near the southeast corner of appellants' 
property. The post in a most westerly position is oppo-
site the west end of a garage erected on the respond-
ents' property. The most easterly post is 4.5 feet north 
of the property line. Coming in a westerly direction, 
the next post is 4 feet north of the line: the next is 5.3 
feet north of the line; and the most westerly post is 5.2 
feet north of the property line. (Deposition of Daniel 
Murray Davis, pgs. 4-10; R-51) 
Appellants' land has been used solely for agricul-
tural purposes until the present time. ( T-17; Deposi-
tion of Daniel Murra!' Davis, pgs. 6-10) 
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In 1923, respondents' predecessor in interest con-
structed a house on respondents' property. About a 
year later he constructed a garage on the property. A 
portion of this garage, 16.2 feet in length, extends across 
the boundary line between the appellants' propert;r 
and the respondents' property. At the easterly most 
end it extends 2.3 feet onto appellants' property and 
at the westerly most end it extends 2.7 feet onto appel-
lants' property. (R-51 with Ex.; R-70) 
Respondents' predecessor in interest attempted to 
purchase land from appellants' predecessor in interest 
along the southerly border of appellants' property i11 
order to widen respondents' driveway leading to the 
above garage. Appellants' predecessor in interest n•-
fused to sell, but permitted respondents' predecessM 
in interest to use part of appellants' land for this pnr-
pose. Thereafter respondents' predecessor in interest 
extended a low curb or retaining wall from near th0 
western edge of the garage extending in a westc>rly di-
rection to within 8 feet of the street. At the east <:>nd the 
curb is 4.5 feet north of the boundary line and at the 
west end it is 4.63 feet north of the boundary. (Deposi-
tion of Leon Brough Riley, pg. 4; Deposition of Gleu 
K. Riley, pg. 5; Deposition of Lois Brough Riley, pg. 16: 
Deposition of Daniel ~furray Dads, pgs. 10-12; R-51-52 
with attached Ex. R-53) 
Prior to the construction of the curb or retaining 
wall respondents' predecessor in interest had planted 
several trees on the north side of respondents' drive-
way adjacent to the south edge of the curb. (T-6, 7; R-52 
with attached Ex.) 
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The families of the appellants and the respondents 
had been close friends for many years until the pres-
rnt dispute arose - even to the point of exchang-
ing the affectionate title of "uncle" or "aunt." (Depo-
sition of Loise Brough Riley, pg. 28) 
Thr respondents state that they have always treat-
e<l the old fence line erected prior to the division of the 
property as the boundary line between respondents' 
property and appellants' property. However, none of 
the respondents ever discussed the boundary line with 
appellants or appellants' predecessor in interest. There 
was never a dispute or conversation regarding the mat-
ter. They "had no occasion to"; "the question just 
never came up.'' (Deposition of Glen K. Riley, pg. 6; 
deposition of Lois Brough Riley, pg. 27; deposition of 
Leon Brough Riley, pg. 3) 
\Vhile the respondents state that they always con-
sidered the old fence line as the boundary between the 
two properties, they don't know whether the appellants 
or appellants' predecessor in interest considered that 
line to be the boundary. (Deposition of Lois Brough 
Riley, pg. 27) 
Appellants made a motion for summary judgment 
which was served on respondents on November 9, 1966. 
The motion was called for hearing on November 22, 
1966. Affidavits and a memorandum of authorities 
were file<l with the motion. (R-29-40) 
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Respondents did not file auy responsin• ffi(•mo-
randa, pleadings or affidavits until the time set for the 
hearing on appellants' motion for summary judgment. 
At that time respondents filed an amended answer and 
counterclaim. (R-23) The amended counterdaim lim-
ited respondents' affirmative prayer for relief to " 'the 
disputed fence line doctrine' or 'the boundary liue acqui-
escence doctrine' see Ekberg v. Bates, 121 U. 12:3, 2:l!J 
P2d 205, and like cases." (R-25) At this time respond-
ents also made an oral motion for summary judgment. 
The court then found as follows: 
"Insofar as it would appear from the CYidPrn'<' 
of the defendants, the defendants haYe substantial 
evidence as follows, Number one, that they have 
held possession of the laud in question for a pr-
riod of going back more than 26 years and that 
there is no evidence or any assertion or a11y other 
type of ownership in existence for that period. 
The Court further believes that the constructioH 
of the garage in the general pictures of the area is 
such that they would imply a boundary line such 
as the construction of the garage on lands is e\'i-
dence of some claim of ownership at tlw time it 
was done. The Court belie,·es that the dead mall 
statute would preclude the conversation between 
the two predecessors in interest to go hack into 
the thirties in this action. I believe that statute 
to be moot in that it does not show any elaim hy 
plaintiffs in this instance, any claim of this larnl 
in use beyond the fence as here testified to. 
"The Court believes that the evidenee of the 
defendants as such in this case would have to hr 
accepted by a finder of fact unless refuted. 
"The Court further finds that there is no e\·i-
dence to refute it. 
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'' 'rhe ( 'oud therefore grants defendants' mo-
tio11 for Rtmuna r~' judgment." ( T-22-23) 
Prior to judgment being entered on this Order, ap-
pellants made a motion for reconsideration of sum-
mary judgment (R-44) haRed principally on (1) an af-
fidavit by a p<:>rson not precluded by the dead man';; 
statute from testifyi11g regarding a conversation he-
tween appellants' predecessor in interest and reRpond-
ents' predecessor in i11terest, and ( 2) a scale drawing 
of the land aml land marks in question. The affidavit 
states in substance (R-:J3) that appellants' predecessor 
in interest permitted respondents' predecessor in inter-
est to use part of appellants' property for respondents' 
driveway. The scale drawing and attached affidavit 
(R-51) show that the old fence posts, the garage, the old 
trees and the curb or retaining wall were not in any di-
rect line or particular order (see ahow) hut varied con-
siderably - the garage heing 3 feet south of one fence 
post and more than 3 feet south of the curb or retaining 
wall. Respondents had introduced an exhibit at the orig-
inal hearing indicating that these land marks were all on 
line. That exhihit did not purport to he drawn to scale, 
but was represented as being "graphic." (T-1, 3; Defts. 
unnumbered Exhibit) 
At the time for the hearing on appellants' motion 
to reconsider the entering of summary judgment for the 
respondents, the Court ruled as follows: 
''The Court makes its bench ruling as follows: 
First of all, as to the surny here submitted h~- the 
plaintiff, I helien it is. Plaintiff's counsel, the 
survey would further confirm the earliPr ruling of 
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the Court and is suggestive construction of a 
sighted straight line which would establish the 
fence posts as an acknowledged boundary. This 
is true not only of both smTeys of the land in 
question but the extention on into the area beyond 
the land. This evidence would further support the 
past motion granted. 
''The testimony offered h)' the affidavit of Kel-
ly Davis would be adverse to the early ruling am] 
was not onto the Court at the time of the ruling, 
that both sides heard one another's eYidence and 
they both submitted the matter to the court hy 
consent at the time it was ruled upon with the un-
derstanding that they were ready to stand upon 
the state of their evidence as they presented it at 
that time. The Court ruled upon it then. The 
Court views the presentation of the Kelly Davi!' 
affidavit is in equity a presentation of newly dis-
co-.;ered evidence and that in substance the Court 
is faced with the proposition of whether or not 
this evidence is strong enough that if presented at 
a new trial would change the ruling. There is no 
question in my mind that had this been presented 
at the hearing for summary judgment the sum-
mary judgment would haYe been denied on the 
basis of what Kelly Davis presented unless it was 
opposed by other affidavit which might have been 
presented at the same time. 
"It would have raised the question of fact, but 
coming late as it does and the parties, each of 
them having submitted it, the Court rule as fol-
lows in and of itself it does not present a suffi-
ciently strong position to justify the reopening of 
the question once submitted." (R-25, 26) 
Thereafter, the Court entered summary judgment 
in favor of respondents and against the appellants. 
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In their amended answer and counter claim, respond-
ents state the basis for their claim to part of appellants' 
property as follows : 
"Thus, this situation is governed by the judicial 
doctrine known as 'the disputed fence line doc-
trine' or 'the boundary line acquiescence doc-
trine,' see Ekberg v. Bates, 121 U. 123, 239 P2d 
205, and like cases.'' (R-25) 
Respondents abandoned any other basis for affirma-
tive relief which may have been presented in their origi-
nal answer and counterclaim. Inasmuch as record title 
to the property in question is in the appellants (R-31, 
Ex. A), the lower court should have granted appellants' 
motion for summary judgment quieting title to that prop-
erty in appellants unless respondents could offer evi-
dence to the effect that appellants conduct, or the conduct 
of their predecessor in interest, had been such as to pass 
title to respondents. 
The case of Ekberg v. Bates, on which respondents 
rely, is a 1951 case decided by this court which very care-
fully considers the conditions under which one may lose 
title to land to a neighbor. The facts of the case are these: 
Plaintiff and defendant owned adjacent lots which 
had previously been part of one parcel. In 1894, 
the owner of this parcel built a picket fence be-
tween the lots. Thereafter, he conveyed the lots 
in separate parcels. One was conveyed to plain-
tiff's father and one was eventually conveyed to 
defendant. In 1921 (while his father still owned 
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what eventually became plaintiff'8 lot) plaintiff 
complained that the pieket fence di<l not mark the 
true bom1dary hetween the two lots as per the 
survey. Nevertheless, plaintiff's father in 1927 
helped defendant's predecessor in interest C'Oll-
struct a stout high hoard fence on exactlv t hr 
same line on which the old fence had stood. Plain-
tiff, both before and after he acquired title to 11i:-; 
property protested that tht> fence was not on 
the true boundary line. The plaintiff, ho\\·cvt•1-, 
did not take any adi011 to assert ownership to th 
disputed land until some 14 vears after he finaiiY 
acquired title to his fathe1:'s lot. · 
Thr Court held: "\Vhen Ekberg, Sr., helped rr-
spondents' immediate predecessor in interest 
huild the fence in 1927 he knew that the orii.6-
nal fence line might not he the true boundary linr 
because he had heard his son scrapping with the 
neighbors aliout it and claiming that their feIH'P 
was on his father's property. He kiww that n•-
spondents' grant or claimed the property up to tlH· 
fence and therefore when he helped build the new 
fence he acquiesced in that being the boundary 
line between the properties involved. He did i1ot 
convey his property to appellants until 1935. H'I' 
hai:e here then an actual acquiescence in the fen('e 
as a boundary for 8 years which is more than the 
period required in our statute of limitations for 
actions for defenses founded upon real property, 
see Section 104-2-6, U.C.A., 1943, plus actual oc-
cupancy and possession up to the original picket 
fence by different owners since 1921 ... '' ( empha-
sis added) 
The opinion in the Ekberg case cites the case of 
Brown v. Milliner, 232 P2d 202, 207, as follows: 
"\Ve also said therein: '* * * that in the absence 
of evidence that the owners of adjoining property 
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or their predecessors in interest ever expressly 
agreed as to the location of the boundary between 
them, if they have occupied their respective prem-
ises up to an open boundary line visibly marked 
by monuments, fences or huiklings for a long pe-
riod of time and mutually rerognized it as the di-
ridi.ug line betu.·een them, the law will imply an 
agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can 
do so consistently with the facts appearing ... " 
(emphasis added) 
The Ekberg case also cites Willie v. Local Realty Co., 
110 Utah 523, 175 P2d 718, as follows: 
"Defendant contends that there was no dispute or 
uncertainty about the <fo·ision line in this case 
hecause the deeds were clear and certain and each 
lot had the full frontage called for by the deeds 
and therefore the rule relating to establishment 
of boundaries hy acquiescence does not apply. It 
is true that the line called for by the deeds could 
have easily heen ascertained by a snn·ey. How-
rver, a boundary line may be 'uncertain' or 'in 
clispute' enn though it is capable of being readily 
ascertained. The rital question is ll'hetl1er t71e ad-
jacrnt o11"ners 1che11 they fixer! the line or acqui-
esced in its beiug fixed 1rere uncertain or in dis-
pute about the location of the actual line." (em-
phasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court considered "boundary 
by acquiescence'' involving a fence erected when the 
same person owned the land on both sides in the case 
of Home Owners' Loam Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P2d 
160, where it stated: 
"The case of Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 
912, 69 A.L.R. 1417, constitutes a complete answer 
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to the arguments of plaiHtiff u11d0r its claim of 
an established fence line by acquiescence. The 
fence as not shown to ha,·e been establiRhed to 
settle any dispute or to establish any houudarv 
line, the tnie location of which was unknown o'r 
e,·en uncertain. See Briern et al. Y. Smith et al., 
100 Utah 213, 112 P2d 145. Nor is the evidence 
here such as to justify a finding that the parties 
hereto recognized the fence line on the hig-hway 
as the true boundary lin0. The fact is that one 
time the highway went through the properties of 
appellant. She owned lands on both sides. It co11lrl 
hardly be said that a highway boundary line feucr 
could hare been erected to settle a, dispute behcP;en 
ad_joining land owners when the la1nds on both 
sides of the road u:ere ou:ned by the same person. 
See Coop v. George A. Lowe Co., 71 Utah 145, 
263 P. 485." (emphasis added) 
And in the Brown v. MillinP;r case, supra, the court 
added: 
"The fact that a land-owner allows others to 
share with him the use of his land does not neces-
sarily signify a disclaimer of ownership. And 
this is perhaps even more true when, as in the 
instant case the location of the true boundary 
does not appear to have been known to the adjoin-
ing owners. A person should be presumed to 
claim title to all the land called for by his rlerrl 
unless it clearly appears otherwise." (emphasis 
added) 
In resume, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
in the various cases it has decided pertaining to bound-
ary by acquiescence, has held as follows: 
1. A fence erected when land on both sides was 
owned by the same person could not have been 
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ereoted to settle a dispute between adjoining 
land owners. 
2. The important question is whether the ad-
jacent owners when they fixed the line or 
acquiesced in its being fixed were uncertain or 
in dispute about the location of the actual line. 
3. Any dividing line fixed must have been mu-
tually recognized as the dividing line between 
them. 
4. The fact that a land-owner allows others to 
share with him the use of his land does not 
necessarily signify a disclaimer of ownership. 
0. A person is presented to claim title to all of 
the land called for by his deed unless it clearly 
appears otherwise. 
In applying the above enunciated law to the present 
situation, the following facts should be kept in mind: (1) 
appellants' land has been used solely for agricultural 
purposes up to the present time (T-17; Deposition of 
Daniel Murray Davis, pgs. 6-10); and (2) the families 
of both appellants and the respondents had been close 
friends for many years and until the present dispute 
arose - even to the point of exchanging the affection 
title of "uncle" or "aunt." (Deposition of Lois Brough 
Riley, pg. 28) 
The undisputed evidence is that the four poles re-
maining from a fence that once existed in the general 
vicinity of the disputed boundary line were part of a 
fence erected when one person owned both the property 
of the appellants and the property of the respondents. 
It was erected to keep cattle out of a garden. It was 
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11ot C'redl•cl to <ldermiuP a11y ho11nda1·y. 'l'ht• find time 
Lois Brough RilC'y rememlwrs seeing any of tlw land in 
question, all that remained of the' fence were the' four 
poles that are still standing. N Oil(' of the respondent:-; 
have any knowledge conc0rning who ereckd it or \Yhy. 
It was actuall:· erecte<l by a pr0deeessor iu iuten-st of 
both parties who at the time owned all the proprrty in 
question. (Deposition of Daniel :\I urray Davis, pgs. 
4-10; Deposition of Glen K. Riley, pg. 6; Deposition of 
Lois Brough Riley, pg. 27; Deposition of Leon Brough 
Riley, pg. 3) 
Appellants have owned their laud inrnlw(l lH'r<:>in 
only since l\Iarch of 1966. Prior to that time - and dnr-
ing the time here under consideration - it was owned hy 
Daniel Mnrray Davis. (R-;{7, Ex A) Leonidas G. Riley 
owned respondents' land from 1920 until his d0ath on 
.June 2, 1964. (D0position of Lois Brough Ril0;-, pg. 4, 
8, Ex. 1; R-72 with Ex.) ThC're is ahsolutel;· no evi<lenep 
of any kind whatsoever that an:· dispntC' ever took pl<H·e 
betweC'n Daniel Murray Davis and LC'oni<las G. Rile~ 
concerning the location of tlH' hounclar:· separating their 
respective properties. In fact, all of the respondents 
agre0 that as far as the:· know th0 matter was not 0\·t·n 
discussed. (Deposition of Glen K. Rile:·, pg. 6; D0posi-
tion of Lois Brough Riley, pg. 27; Depositio11 of L0011 
Brough Riley, pg. 3) The only evidence in the record in-
dicates that Daniel l\f urray Da,·is and Leonidas G. Rile:· 
were aware that Riley was using Da,·is' larnl with Dm·i,;' 
permission. All of the respondents testified that Leoni-
das C. Riley tried to purchase part of Daniel :\lurrn~· 
Davis' land along the honnclar:· line nn<1 thnt Da11it•1 
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jf urray Davis refused to sell. (Deposition of Leon 
Brough Riley, pg. 4; Deposition of Glen K. Riley, pg. 
5; Deposition of Lois Brough Riley, pg. 16; Deposition 
of Daniel ~Iurray Davis, pgs. 10-12) The testimony of 
Daniel ~Iurray Davis was to the effect that Leonidas G. 
Riley tried to purchase land along the boundary line, that 
Davis refused to sell but that he told Riley that he could 
go ahead and use it. (Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, 
pgs. 10-12) 'l'his testimony - which respondents at-
tacked on the grounds of the dead man's statute - was 
suhsta11tiatC'cl by an affidavit of a person to whom that 
statute does not apply. (R-53) Leonidas G. Riley exe-
rut(•d a (leed making his wife a joint tenant with him in 
rP"JlOlHlents' land. 'fhe deed dC'scTihes the land accord-
ing to the survey and prC'vious legal descriptions. It 
makes no attempt to claim any of appellants' land ... 
and 11either did Leonidas G. Riley during his lifetime. 
(Kx. 1 to Deposition of Lois Brough Riley) 
There is absolutely no evidence that appellants or 
their predecessor in interest ever acquiesced in establish-
ing any boundary line between the properties of the a1i-
pellants and the respondents other than that provi<lc•d 
in their respective deeds. The individual respondents 
testified that they regarded the old fence line as the 
ooundary between the properties. They also testified 
that the matter was never discussed with the appellants 
or appellai1ts' prede<>essor in int Prest, hecaus!:' the.\' "had 
no occasion to''; ''the question just never eame up.'' 
(Deposition of Glen K. Riley, pg. 6; Deposition of Lois 
Brough Ril<'y, pg. 27; Deposition of Leon Brough Riley, 
pg. 3) ~[rs. Lois Brough Riley is the henefieial owner 
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of respondents' land. Ou pages 27 an<l 28 of her deposi-
tion she testified concerning the four old posts remain-
ing from the former fence and her actions ·with r<.'speet 
to them and the purported boundary: 
Q. You talked about the fact that this fence line 
was considered a bom1dary. Di<l you ever 
have any conversation with Mr. Davis a.bout 
boundary lines? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever have any conversations with Mr. 
Ross Davis or Mrs. Mary Dm'is a bout bound-
ary lines~ 
A. No. 
Q. So that insofar as you are able to speak of 
your own knowledge ~'on considered it a 
boundary line but you didn't know whether 
they did or not~ 
A. I guess, yes. 
Q. The posts that are still there from that fence 
line, have they ever been moved 1 
A. No. 
Q. The posts that a.re still standing are those the 
ones that were tlwre when yon got there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are they in the same condition substantially 
as when you got there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So the question of where the boundary line was 
actually never was discussed with the Davises~ 
A. No. We had no occasion to. 
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The respondents' pred~essor in interest planted some 
trees in the general area. Again, there is absolutely no 
eYidence that appellants or their predecessor in interest 
regarded these trees as forming a boundary line much 
less acquiesced in the fact that they established a bound-
ary line. Respondents' predecessor in interest construct-
ed a curb or low retaining wall extending along the north 
side of his driveway toward the street. The curb is on 
appellants' property. However, there is absolutely no 
e''idence that appellants or their predecessor in interest 
enr considered that it constituted a boundary line. The 
only evidence is to the eff~t that they did not, but that 
the curb was constructed with the permission of appel-
lants' predeeessor in interest after he had refused tn 
sell respondents' predecessor in interest any land. (See 
a hove; R-53) 
About the year 1924, respondents' predecessor in 
interest eonstructecl a garage on resp<mclents' property. 
A po1iion of this garage 16.2 feet in length extends across 
the boundary line onto appellants' property. At the east-
erly most end it extends 2.3 feet onto appellants' prop-
erty and at the west end it extends 2. 7 feet onto appel-
lants' property. The old fence posts are 4.5, 4, 5.3 and 
5.2 feet inside of appellants' properly. There is abso-
lutely no e''idence that the garage was enr intended to 
establish a boundary line between the properties. (R-51 
with Ex.; R-70; Deposition of Daniel ~[urray Davis, 
pgs. 4-10) 
It is respectfully submitted that the entire record be-
fore the lower eourt was consistent with the fact that 
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appellants owu tlw land descrihell in thl'ir der<l, that 110 
facts or circumstances exist which woul<l justify depriv-
ing them of their property, and that the lower court encd 
in refusing to enter summary judgmrnt in their fa\·or. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG~IENT 
Summary judgment is a remedy an1ilahle only when 
there are no triable issues. It is appellants' contentio11 
that in the instant case, no e,·idenC'e on an;· issue has hee11 
presented whiC'l1 would justify a court depri,·ing apprl-
lants of any of the property to whiC'l1 they hold record 
title. However, if the lower Court properly held that 
Summary Judgment should not he entered for appel-
lants (which appellants submit was erroneous, supra). 
under the Utah Law, the Court dearly erred in entering 
Summary Judgment for the n•spondents. 
In the case of Kidman v. White, 318 P2d 898, thi~ 
Court said: 
'' ... a Summary Judgment, which turns a party 
out of court without an opportunity to present 
his evidence, is a harsh measure that should bP 
qranted only when, taking the riew most farnr-
~ble to a. pa,rty's claim and any proof that might 
properly be adduced thereunder, he could in 110 
event prevail." (emphasis added) 
In this case there ar<' many facts that would han• to 
he rC'solved in respondents' favor iu ordN for r<'spondc11t 
to be entitled to judgment. 
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A finding would have to be made that appellants or 
appellants' predecessor in interest acquiesced in estab-
lishing a bomidary between appellants' and respondents' 
properties different than the boundary established by 
their respective deeds. As set forth above, no evidence 
exists for such a proposition. The only evidence concern-
iug the existence of any such boundaries is that the pres-
ent respondents considered it to exist. In the absence of 
any evidence that appellants or their predecessor in in-
terest considered the boundary to have been altered, the 
most that can he said in respondents' favor is that they 
claim it did. Certainly, appellants' discussion, supra, 
shows a hundant evidence to support appellants' conten-
tion that neither appellants nor their predecessor in 
interest ever acquiesced in the establishment of any 
boundary oth0r than the one set by the deeds. 
~[oreover, the problem exists of where to draw the 
hounclary line. Is the garage, a portion of which ex-
tends from 2 .. 3 to 2.7 feet onto appellants' property, to 
he the deciding factor as the trial judge once in<licated? 
(T-22-23) Or are the old fence posts, which are from 
-! fret to 3.3 feet north of the true boundary? Are they 
to lw used in determining a boundary by acquiescence 
ewn though erected when both appellants' and respond-
ents' properties were owned hy the same person and 
there was no boundary to establish, and even though re-
spondents ha,·c produced no evidence to the effect that 
appellants or their predecessor in interest ever consid-
('re<l that these old posts ever designated a boundary? 
Or is the curb constructed along the north side of re-
~pon<lents' dri\'eway to determine the boundary, in spite 
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of the fact that the evidence is that it was eo11structetl by 
respondents' predecessor in interest with permission of 
appellants' predecessor in interest and after a ppeJ-
lants' predecessor in interest ha<l refused to sell respond-
ents' predecessor in interest any land along the boundary 
between their respective properties~ 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that they were en-
titled to Summary Judgment in their favor in this case. 
In the alternative, they are l'ertainly entitled to have the 
ca.se remanded to the lower Court for a trial on the 
merits. 
BARKER & RYBERG 
211 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Attorneys for Plaantiffs 
and Appellants 
